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INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers and legal scholars rightly remember Adolf A. Berle for his 
bold and startling ideas about the modern corporation and the transformed 
social relationships that came with a world of large organizations and 
finance capitalism. Berle’s diverse career moved well beyond legal 
scholarship, however, to encompass U.S. policymaking in both the 
domestic sphere and in international affairs during the interwar years and 
beyond. Although his approach to foreign policy may have lacked the 
stunning originality of The Modern Corporation and Private Property and 
its path-breaking reinterpretation of the nature of corporate power and high 
finance, Berle’s conception of international order matters for the insights 
it provides about U.S. engagement with a deteriorating global political 
environment during the chaotic interwar years. Contrary to present-day 
popular images of the time period as an era of foreign policy neglect, Berle 
and his internationalist peers thought seriously and extensively about 
world affairs, and they vigorously pursued innovations in law, economic 
relationships, and global culture in order to try to create a more stable and 
cooperative international system. 
General histories of the United States in the 1920s frequently gloss 
over foreign policy altogether, while studies of the 1930s too often treat 
the Great Depression in predominantly American terms, as a matter of 
domestic economic policy and social crisis.1 Consequently, it has been all 
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 1. Frederick Lewis Allen’s 1931 classic, Only Yesterday, did much to establish the “roaring 
twenties” image of the 1920s as an era in which the United States turned inward and concentrated on 
the frivolity of fads, fashion, and mass consumerism in an age of economic expansionism following 
the disappointments of Versailles and the domestic political upheaval of the post-World War I Red 
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too easy for Americans to imagine the interwar years as largely removed 
from global currents, except for the wrenching political debates over 
neutrality (too often misrepresented as an unthinking “isolationism”) from 
1935 onward that finally ended with the rude awakening of Pearl Harbor 
in December 1941.2 In reality, however, world events formed a constant 
preoccupation for politically attentive Americans in the interwar period. 
Like other liberal internationalists, Berle faced an unraveling world with a 
keen awareness of the upheaval that dogged European relations from the 
end of World War I onwards, a bitter recognition of the heavy toll of 
modern warfare, and an ardent desire to create new mechanisms to 
promote peace and stability in a world that seemed capable of achieving 
neither. 
With these considerations in mind, this essay explores Berle’s 
understanding of American power and its relationship to global order in 
the era between the First and Second World Wars. I first survey the history 
of progressive internationalism in the 1920s in order to situate Berle’s 
approach to U.S. foreign relations and global affairs, before proceeding to 
a close examination of Berle’s immediate response to the aftermath of 
World War I, and then his foreign policy activities as part of the Roosevelt 
administration in the late 1930s and early 1940s. My analysis focuses in 
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particular on his public efforts to promote a transformative vision of global 
affairs based on two principles: (1) a belief in the exceptionalism of the 
Americas as a solution to the constant turmoil of power politics on the 
European continent; and (2) a faith in a liberal international economic 
order as the answer to the growing geopolitical strife of the post-World 
War I decades. 
In both areas, Berle combined quintessential features of long-
established, historically grounded tenets of U.S. foreign relations with key 
elements of American liberal internationalism and his own expertise in 
law, economics, and finance. His enthusiasm for the “cooperative peace” 
of the Americas embodied traditional attitudes about the contrast between 
corrupt Old World practices and the redemptive possibilities of the New 
World, melded with twentieth-century internationalists’ pursuit of 
alternatives to power politics and Berle’s own experiences in Latin 
America. On the economic front, Berle’s confidence in the virtues of free 
trade and an open world typified American foreign policy orthodoxy, but 
also incorporated his own inimitable thoughts on modern realities in an 
age of large-scale finance. His thinking also rested on a well-established 
progressive intellectual tradition that associated modernity with 
fundamental shifts in the very structure of international relations. 
According to this line of analysis, the novel possibilities—and dangers—
of an interdependent world order mandated the ascendance of peaceful 
relationships and the pursuit of the common good on a global scale as 
necessary alternatives to the ruinously destructive forms of competition 
created by great power politics. 
More than mere historical interest motivates this account of Berle’s 
involvement with U.S. foreign relations during the fraught interwar years. 
Americans conditioned by the bipolar geopolitics of the Cold War have 
not had an easy time reckoning with the uncertainties of international 
relations at a time when U.S. expectations of preponderance of power no 
longer hold. Berle’s vision of American globalism ultimately could not 
escape an essential tension, namely, the inability of liberal 
internationalism to reconcile U.S.-centric versions of order and stability 
with an implied commitment to global pluralism. This central 
shortcoming, however, should not prevent readers today from recognizing 
the vibrancy, energy, and creativity that Berle and his contemporaries 
brought to bear on international affairs in the interwar period. For twenty-
first century readers daunted by present-day international conditions, the 
political challenges of the post-World War I epoch provide a basis for 
contemplating what it means for a nation to navigate an unstable, 
multipolar world and its shifting centers of power. 
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I. POST-WORLD WAR I INTERNATIONALISM AND AMERICAN GLOBAL 
ENGAGEMENT IN THE 1920S 
Berle’s understanding of international affairs evolved out of the 
complex world of American internationalism in the interwar years. After 
World War II, defenders of the idea that global stability demanded 
American leadership created a highly skewed and misleading historical 
narrative that alleged an American withdrawal from international affairs 
between the wars. According to this line of interpretation, the Senate’s 
post-World War I rejection of U.S. membership in the League of Nations 
constituted a key turning point, in which rather than endorsing Wilsonian 
internationalism, the United States turned away from global engagement.3 
This ruinous decision to step away from responsibility and decline the 
mantle of leadership directly paved the way for World War II, and it 
symbolized the high price of American neglect of international relations 
during the 1920s and 1930s.4 
This myth of interwar isolationism, which was invented to defend the 
U.S.-sponsored reconstruction of global order after World War II, masked 
the diverse forms of engagement and strenuous efforts to find a path to 
peace and stability that defined U.S. foreign relations in the 1920s. Deep-
seated bitterness certainly lingered in progressive circles over the post-
World War I settlement and a sense of promise betrayed at Versailles. 
Strong disagreements also persisted over how the United States should 
best deal with the unstable borders and threats of incipient warfare that 
continued to foment tensions across Europe, the dangerous volatility of 
imperial competition in East Asia, and the constant state of debt crisis that 
dogged trans-Atlantic relations. This harsh international environment, 
however, led not to withdrawal but to novel attempts to find some way out 
of the morass of a disordered postwar world. Consequently, presidents, 
secretaries of state, individual congressmen, diplomats, peace activists, 
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at 345–48. 
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Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, 1921–1936: Interwar Diplomacy, OFF. 
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business leaders, lawyers, academics, and Americans from other walks of 
life participated actively in a 1920s era rich with multilateral diplomacy, 
peace politics, and economic and cultural relations. 
The three agreements that emerged from the Washington Conference 
of 1921–1922—the Four-Power, Five-Power, and Nine-Power treaties—
constituted the signature diplomatic achievement of U.S. foreign policy in 
the immediate aftermath of the post-World War I settlement, and they 
reflected both geopolitical considerations and the long-held aspirations of 
the organized peace movement. The Four-Power and Nine-Power treaties 
sought to guarantee order by stabilizing imperial relations in East Asia 
through an agreement by the United States, Japan, Great Britain, and 
France to respect each other’s colonial holdings and to consult in moments 
of crisis, and a pledge signed by these four nations, plus China and four 
additional European countries, to uphold China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Taken together, these provisions amounted to standard 
diplomatic professions of good faith in the service of mutual self-interest.5 
By contrast, the Five-Power Treaty, which promoted naval 
disarmament by placing limits on the fleets of the United States, Great 
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, captured the imagination of American 
“peace progressives” who had steadfastly rejected the Versailles Treaty as 
a corrupt expression of power politics.6 Secretary of State Charles Evans 
Hughes, in his opening address at the Washington Conference in 
November 1921, gave a nod to the peace movement’s perspective when 
he made the case for disarmament by decrying the wastefulness of military 
budgets and the “crushing burden created by competition in armament,” 
as well as the tendency of arms races to shatter the very peace that they 
attempted to enforce.7 For a peace movement that had long associated arms 
production with militarism, insecurity, and international conflict, a treaty 
that in some instances actually mandated the destruction of war materiel 
in order to bring American and British naval power in compliance signaled 
the potential for internationalist alternatives to surmount states’ ruinous 
acquisition of armaments in the name of self-defense. 
The failure and collapse of all three agreements in the face of 
Japanese expansionism and German rearmament in the 1930s led post-
World War II observers to dismiss their significance, but at the time of 
their creation, the Four-, Five-, and Nine-Power treaties constituted a 
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supra note 4, at 50–55. 
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Commissioner to the Conference on Limitation of Armament 4 (Nov. 12, 1921). 
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major point of departure in states’ desperate efforts to contain the sources 
of conflict that had produced the First World War.8 In the 1920s, 
proponents of international cooperation and liberal order fully expected to 
build on the diplomatic foundation laid at the Washington Conference. 
Disarmament talks, for example, continued apace, with the United States 
as an active participant. 
In one noteworthy moment, Columbia University historian and 
international relations expert James T. Shotwell, who energetically 
promoted international organizations and strengthened international 
institutions throughout the interwar years, helped to formulate a new Draft 
Treaty of Disarmament and Security in 1924 that contributed to 
discussions within the League of Nations.9 A new international conference 
at Geneva in 1927 failed to advance further naval reductions, but in 1930, 
President Herbert Hoover backed a return to negotiations, and modest 
agreements resulted at the London Naval Conference.10 In addition, the 
World Disarmament Conference continued to convene periodically, if 
hopelessly, in Geneva between 1932 and 1937, even as Japanese 
incursions in Manchuria escalated to all-out warfare in China, and Europe 
continued to unravel amid the stresses of global economic depression, 
resurgent nationalism, and the rise of fascism.11 Such developments 
indicated the reality of an American commitment to strengthening the 
stability of the post-World War I international system even absent U.S. 
membership in the League of Nations. 
American participation in traditional multilateral diplomacy and 
attempts to create a new international order liberated from power politics 
continued in other areas as well throughout the 1920s. Struggles to find 
political means of dealing with reparations, war debts, and their continued 
drag on European economies formed a constant preoccupation of 
American policymakers, leading bankers, and opinion leaders. In 1924 and 
1929, private financiers worked with the U.S. government to broker the 
Dawes Plan and the Young Plan, both designed to try to address the 
                                                     
 8. As George C. Herring has noted, post-1945 condemnation of the agreements forged at the 
Washington Naval Conference “reflect ex post facto and ahistorical reasoning.” GEORGE C. HERRING, 
FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 1776, at 454–56, 479–80, 490 
(2008). In addition, Akira Iriye pointed out in the early 1990s that until the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, “the 1920s was the 
only decade in recent history when arms reductions actually took place.” IRIYE, supra note 6, at 78. 
 9. JAMES T. SHOTWELL, ON THE RIM OF THE ABYSS 14–21 (Garland Publ’g, Inc. 1972) (1936). 
 10. HERRING, supra note 8, at 479–80. 
 11. ZARA STEINER, THE LIGHTS THAT FAILED: EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 1919–
1933, at 755–97, 812–15 (2005); Andrew Webster, The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats 
and Soldiers in the League of Nations’ Pursuit of International Disarmament, 1920–1938, 14 
CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 493 (2005). 
2019] Looking Forward in a Failing World 391 
recurrent political crises associated with European debt after World War 
I.12 
The Dawes Plan patched over the Ruhr crisis, which broke out early 
in 1923 when France, along with Belgium, responded to Germany’s failure 
to keep up with reparations payments by sending in occupation forces. The 
restructuring of German debt under the Dawes Plan restored the flow of 
reparations, which forestalled the possibility of renewed warfare between 
France and Germany for the moment, and Charles G. Dawes even won a 
share of the 1925 Nobel Peace Prize for his role in negotiating the 
agreement. American observers, however, remained alert to the economic 
and political instabilities that continued to threaten postwar Europe.13 The 
New Republic, founded in 1914 as a leading journal of progressive thought 
and commentary, described the measure as a “tolerable compromise” but 
also labeled it a stop-gap measure against an otherwise “irresistible 
descent towards economic and political chaos in Europe.” At the heart of 
the problem lay the counterproductive machinery of punitive reparations 
imposed by the Versailles Treaty. The post-World War I settlement led to 
an “inevitable German default” that France had used as a pretext “to seize 
the heart of industrial Germany.”14 In doing so, however, the French had 
undermined their own economic and political position: “They soon found 
that, while they were gradually ruining Germany, they were also exposing 
themselves and the whole of Europe to disaster.”15 
To the extent that European economic conditions normalized in the 
mid-1920s, they did so only with the massive infusion of American capital. 
Far from being uninvolved, the United States constituted, as Akira Iriye 
has put it, “the main sustainer of the international economic system during 
the 1920s, in particular after 1924.”16 Ultimately, the United States found 
no way to restore Europe’s long-term economic viability within the 
political constraints of American creditors’ insistence that Britain and 
France pay off their war debts, which in turn led both countries’ 
governments to dig in their heels on German reparations. For a brief 
period, however, U.S. leaders thought they had found the cure for Europe’s 
bleak economic and political state, as German reconstruction finally 
seemed to take root with the new infusion of American money. Warren I. 
Cohen has summarized succinctly the sense of cautious optimism that took 
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 13. Id.; IRIYE, supra note 6, at 90. 
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hold: “the peaceful reintegration of Germany into the world community 
and the world economy seemed to have been accomplished by 1928.”17 
With U.S. economic power also came the spread of America’s 
cultural presence abroad, with the dramatic expansion in numbers of 
American tourists in Europe, the spread of U.S. corporate power and 
American business practices, and the growing visibility of American 
consumer goods, including a veritable craze for Hollywood movies and 
their associated glamor.18 When signs of economic weakness loomed in 
Germany in 1929, the Hoover administration’s negotiators attempted to 
prop up European recovery further, by yet again adjusting war reparations 
payments. The resulting Young Plan sought to reduce German reparations 
to manageable levels while still maintaining a high enough flow of cash 
for Britain and France to cover their debt obligations to the United States.19 
On the whole, the wide range of economic interconnections between the 
United States and Europe underscored the depth of American attention to 
and engagement with European affairs throughout the 1920s. 
All of these efforts came to naught when the global economy sank 
into depression in the early 1930s, and European governments responded 
by turning to autarkic strategies. The collaborative possibilities 
represented by the Dawes and Young Plans that had seemingly held such 
promise to generate prosperity now lost legitimacy as the depression 
appeared to demonstrate the price of economic interdependence in its 
capacity to drag national economies down and spread chaos. The 
abandonment of the gold standard by one country after another, in a 
downward spiral of competitive devaluations and beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies, symbolized the era’s repudiation of economic internationalism 
and European nations’ grasping at the straws of nationalism.20 
Nor did the United States find effective means of dealing with the 
prolonged crisis in an era when conventional economic and political 
thought insisted upon the payment of obligations above all else. As futile 
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conferences on the international debt problem continued to convene in the 
early 1930s, the progressive journalist and writer Walter Lippmann took 
U.S. political leaders and policymakers to task for their inability to 
prioritize the world’s overall economic health ahead of the collection of 
reparations and debt. The drag on the German economy imposed by 
reparations payments scheduled to last for more than the next half-century 
was, Lippmann argued, simply unsustainable. But with a stagnant 
American political imagination unable to entertain collective, organized 
arrangements for defaults or debt forgiveness, “rigid and . . . 
nationalistically selfish” responses on the part of both European nations 
and the United States followed as inevitable consequences.21 
Meanwhile, the different elements that made up the organized peace 
movement in the United States also remained active and vigorous in their 
search for international stability throughout the 1920s, through their 
support for disarmament, the strengthening of international law and 
international organizations, the fight against militarism, and the 
development of alternatives to warfare as means for settling international 
disputes.22 Diverse individuals such as Shotwell, legal scholar Quincy 
Wright, and radical pacifist Dorothy Detzer pursued a range of strategies. 
While Shotwell sought to shore up international organization, Wright 
worked on building the theoretical and institutional underpinnings for 
international law, and Detzer, as a leader in the Women’s International 
League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), devoted her life to the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts through democratic deliberation and global 
citizenship, social reform, humanitarian aid, and an end to imperialism.23 
Detzer was also an effective networker and lobbyist who developed direct 
ties to key Congressmen, State Department officials, and the White House, 
and she had powerful allies she could call upon as the WILPF pursued 
legislation or responded to crises.24 Chicago lawyer Salmon O. Levinson 
joined the cause as well, and his ideas about outlawry of war helped to 
pave the way for the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928, in which 
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 22. On the general history of the peace movement and its politics in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, see THOMAS J. KNOCK, TO END ALL WARS: WOODROW WILSON AND THE QUEST 
FOR NEW WORLD ORDER (1992); DAVID PATTERSON, TOWARD A WARLESS WORLD: THE TRAVAIL 
OF THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT, 1887–1914 (1976); JOHN CHALMERS VINSON, WILLIAM E. 
BORAH AND THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR (1957). On the strength and significance of peace activism in 
the 1920s, see IRIYE, supra note 6, at 103–07. Additional works specific to the agenda of peace 
activism in the decade after the end of World War I are cited directly below. 
 23. See DOROTHY DETZER, APPOINTMENT ON THE HILL (1948); Daniel Gorman, International 
Law and the International Thought of Quincy Wright, 1918–1945, 41 DIPL. HIST. 336–61 (2017); 
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the nearly four dozen states that had signed on as of mid-1929 formally 
agreed to “the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.”25 
This world of peace activism and hopes for sweeping reforms in the 
nature and conduct of international relations certainly did not lack for 
critics. Skeptics, both at the time and ever since, have frequently dismissed 
such efforts as impractical and insufficiently cognizant of the realities of 
power.26 Indeed, as global instability spread in the early 1930s, Reinhold 
Niebuhr delivered one of the most powerful, intellectually incisive, and 
influential of such critiques, with his searing analysis in Moral Man and 
Immoral Society of why the morality of individuals in the realm of face-
to-face relationships and empathic human feeling could not be scaled up 
to the behavior of states.27 As the 1930s proceeded, international order 
collapsed and global warfare resumed. The Kellogg-Briand Pact also 
became the foremost symbol of the futility of grand diplomatic gestures 
and a spirit of international comity as a foundation for lasting peace and 
stability.28 
Advocates of peace and internationalism, however, did not see the 
world that way, and their arguments for novel and innovative alternatives 
to raw power as the basis for international conduct reflected a common set 
of beliefs among American internationalists in the first half of the 
twentieth century, including Berle, about the nature of modernity and its 
implications for humans’ potential to transcend their own worst instincts.29 
Their sense of possibility came less from utopian idealism than from a 
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POLITICS (1932). 
 28. For example, Frank Ninkovich has commented on historian Robert H. Ferrell’s “scathing 
dismissal” of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in an analysis from the 1960s. FRANK NINKOVICH, THE 
WILSONIAN CENTURY: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1900, at 97 (1999). Such assessments persist to 
the present day, as in Stephen M. Walt’s recent characterization of the Kellogg-Briand Pact as 
“misplaced idealism.” Stephen M. Walt, There’s Still No Reason to Think the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
Accomplished Anything, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 29, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/29/ 
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 29. NINKOVICH, supra note 28, at 48. 
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determined sense that people and nations desperately needed 
fundamentally new approaches to international affairs in order to stave off 
the terrifying possibilities of modern warfare in an increasingly integrated 
and interdependent world. Historian Frank Ninkovich has eloquently 
described Woodrow Wilson’s understanding of foreign policy in these 
terms, especially in response to World War I and the ease with which “in 
modern circumstances, small conflicts, insignificant in themselves, could 
spiral quickly out of control until the entire world was engulfed.”30 
According to Ninkovich, from Wilson’s standpoint, such a world 
absolutely required a new internationalism that could “replace an 
uncontrolled balance of power” with “an organized and rationally directed 
community of power,” or societies might plunge headlong into radical 
revolution as “the price paid by modern societies for imposing the 
intolerable burdens of modern war upon their civilian populations.”31 
Versions of this brand of Wilsonian thought permeated peace 
progressives’ circles and signified the vigor with which interested 
Americans participated in international affairs during the interwar years. 
Shotwell’s case for liberal internationalism at the end of the 1920s, for 
example, highlighted the changed conditions of modern existence and the 
accompanying social transformations that necessitated the further 
reorganization of human affairs. Although the historical record suggested 
the impossibility of permanent peace, an age of revolutionary scientific 
discoveries had created a modern era of interconnection on a global scale. 
Economic relations that transcended national boundaries raised the 
possibility of large-scale political rearrangements, not out of benevolence 
but out of states’ own sense of self-interest.32 
Given that history had moved from a scientific revolution to an 
industrial revolution, a political revolution towards a more collaborative 
international order seemed but the next logical step. Lest this notion seem 
too fanciful, Shotwell rooted it in a recognition of the harsh facts of 
political life. “We are not eliminating power from the affairs of nations 
when we renounce war,” he contended.33 Instead, “We are only bringing 
into play more pertinent powers than those of the old barbaric and 
destructive sort, powers that are inherent in the constructive rather than the 
destructive energy of civilization.”34 According to Shotwell’s analysis, 
internationalists did not imagine any panaceas that could transcend 
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politics. Rather, they sought means of redirecting power to new ends, in a 
modern era of jarring changes that made fundamental rearrangements of 
human affairs seem possible and necessary, even if difficult, challenging, 
and not guaranteed to produce immediate results. 
In her 1948 memoir, Dorothy Detzer described the expectation of 
slow, incremental change that came with useful activism. She cautioned 
against the attractions of satisfying, but pointless, symbolic gestures, such 
as the forlorn protest of a lone picketer whom she spotted in front of the 
White House one day. “War and its instruments,” she warned, “could not 
be exorcised by negative slogans. Peace was an affirmative value—to be 
won step by difficult step,” and only the “spiritually adolescent” 
anticipated “immediate success.”35 
Detzer went on to explain her understanding of peace as a process 
and not a permanently achievable state of being. With conflict an 
inevitable and ineradicable part of human life, the world needed non-
violent alternatives for settling international disputes. In accordance with 
widespread progressive assumptions in the early twentieth century about 
the possibility of using reason to exert control over human affairs, Detzer 
looked for adjustment and improvement “through the abundant resources 
of ‘good will and pooled intelligence.’”36 Already by the 1920s, she sensed 
acutely the dangers of fascism and the ways in which a harsh postwar order 
was feeding the rise of threatening populisms. In response, she and other 
activists worked throughout the interwar period for the maintenance of 
peace without “wistful illusions,” but in a spirit of hope for eventual 
progress.37 
This practical rationale for a new internationalist global order—that 
it connoted both modern possibility and a necessary attempt to address 
modern danger, and that it represented a pragmatic incrementalism 
without utopian aspiration—established, in the interwar period, a 
foundation for developments in U.S. foreign relations well into the 1940s. 
At the tail end of World War II, as American political leaders mobilized 
support for the formation of the United Nations, they, too, depicted the 
case for international organization, not as an expression of idealism but as 
the outgrowth of a desperate need to find alternatives to the horrific 
violence of total war, which had already reached appalling proportions 
even before the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As Senator 
Arthur H. Vandenberg conceded in making the case for the Senate to 
endorse U.S. membership in the U.N., the new organization constituted an 
experiment that might well fail. But, Vandenberg declared, “I prefer the 
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chance rather than no chance at all,” because if global order collapsed yet 
again, the next world war would “open new laboratories of death too 
horrible to contemplate.”38 Harold E. Stassen, a member of the American 
delegation at the San Francisco conference charged with creating the U.N., 
emphasized the organization’s evolutionary gradualism, in which the U.N. 
was expected to adapt over time to ever-shifting circumstances. The U.N. 
Charter, he told an audience in Washington, D.C. in mid-1945, “is drafted, 
not for a world standing still but for a world that is dynamic and living.”39 
Senator J. William Fulbright, in line with peace progressives’ well-
established concept of peace itself as a process, stressed in the Senate 
debate over ratification that “[p]eace is not a negative, static concept. It is 
not a tranquil state of felicity and blessedness. It is a positive method of 
adjusting the endless conflicts inherent in the nature of restless and 
energetic men.”40 Despite—or rather because of—the collapse of global 
order in the 1930s, internationalist ideology and international organization 
in the form of the U.N. emerged reinvigorated as key means for trying to 
prevent even more devastating wars in the future, not from a stance of 
blind confidence but from a fear of the cost of failure.41 
This was the world in which Adolf A. Berle came of age as he moved 
from early encounters with high-stakes diplomacy as a young adult to his 
rise as a middle-aged statesman and a mover and shaker within the 
Roosevelt Administration in the 1930s. The implications of modern 
interdependence, the dangers of power politics, and the possibilities of 
international cooperation marked his publicly stated efforts to grapple with 
the post-World War I settlement, U.S. relations with Latin America, and 
the deteriorating international sphere of the interwar years. 
II. THE AFTERMATH OF PARIS: BERLE, PROGRESSIVE SKEPTICISM,  
AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW INTERNATIONALISM 
Berle grew up as a precocious child in an intellectually ambitious 
Boston family. He entered Harvard at the age of fourteen, earned a 
Harvard law degree in 1916 at the age of twenty-one, and briefly worked 
at Louis D. Brandeis’s law firm just as Brandeis departed for his 
appointment to the Supreme Court. After the U.S. entry into World War I, 
Berle enlisted in the Army, which led to his initial assignments abroad. He 
first ended up in the Dominican Republic in early 1918, where his legal 
expertise came in handy for helping corporate sugar producers clarify the 
legal status of landholdings during the American occupation that lasted 
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from 1916 to 1924. Then, by happenstance, he was assigned to military 
intelligence as a Russian expert based on nothing more than a reputation 
for being a quick study. He was not sent to Siberia, however, but to Paris, 
as the Army tried to establish its place within the U.S. delegation at the 
peace talks that dominated the first half of 1919. There he rubbed 
shoulders with William Bullitt and the other “young liberals” who 
believed that the United States needed to reach an accommodation with 
Soviet Russia, no matter the lack of ideological appeal of Bolshevism, and 
he watched as the kind of Wilsonian peace he desired fell victim to the 
horse-trading of European powers.42 
The lessons Berle drew from these experiences and his subsequent 
observation of U.S. foreign policy in the early postwar years reflected both 
a sense of bitterness about Versailles and a progressive search for a way 
out of the chaos that had produced the Great War in the first place. In 
August 1919, a little more than a month after his discharge from the Army, 
Berle wrote a commentary in The Nation titled “The Betrayal at Paris.” 
His essay decried the reduction of Wilson’s Fourteen Points to “stock jests 
in the Paris music halls,” condemned the Versailles treaty for avoiding any 
serious reckoning with the colonial question and for selling out claims in 
the Baltics for national self-determination, and maligned the perversion of 
disarmament into a punitive weakening of Germany “while the remainder 
of Europe and Asia armed against each other and their internal 
difficulties.”43 In addition, the negotiations in Paris had corrupted the 
League of Nations beyond recognition. “Colonel House,” Berle ruefully 
declared, “dickered and trafficked for it like any European diplomatic 
spoilsman” and “[e]very Power collected her price—recognition of secret 
treaty-rights, concessions, compromises.”44 Like many postwar 
progressives, Berle denounced the League of Nations, not out of 
opposition to international institutions but because he thought the new 
organization had become so distorted as to be nothing more than a balance-
of-power arrangement. Rather than being the exemplar of a new 
diplomacy, the League had turned into an “abortion of compromise and 
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hate.”45 Even worse, Woodrow Wilson had assented to all of these 
arrangements, and “the master was himself the traitor.”46 
In subsequent essays, Berle elaborated upon this critique of the 
postwar settlement. Writing in the New Republic in mid-1920, he detected 
signs of future conflict in the U.S. intervention in Vladivostok and 
Archangelsk and in the American failure to contain Japanese ambitions in 
Manchuria towards the end of the war. “We have nothing to show for our 
adventure,” Berle observed, “save an unnecessary hate for us in the 
Russian people, and an unnecessary menace in the Pacific.”47 Two years 
after the armistice, he reflected in the Survey on a League of Nations that 
he saw as riven between the potential for progressive economic 
cooperation—“a sort of international communism, to use a dangerous 
term, recognizing social rights in national property above individual 
rights”—and the pursuit of great power imperialism through “an eternal 
grand alliance.”48 
The provocative reference to economic internationalism as a kind of 
“international communism” provided an early indication of the analysis of 
a revolutionary economic order and its implications that Berle would 
develop with such insight and originality in The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property a decade later. For the most part, however, Berle’s 
thinking embodied terms familiar to peace progressives, namely, an 
emphasis on international cooperation and humanitarian possibility 
combined with a distaste for and suspicion of imperial power. As Berle 
noted, states could too easily subvert his prized economic liberal 
alternative. “It must be confessed,” he observed, “that in the very 
awakening of a liberal economic thought lies the greatest danger.”49 
Humanitarian relief efforts and economic aid at their best helped people to 
survive and promised economic recovery and development. Berle warned, 
however, that “if the politicians, the schemers and the diplomatists master 
the idea and capture the machinery, then relief administrations become 
bribes; control of raw materials become tools of oppression or potential 
threat; cooperation in transportation becomes a veiled form of blockade.”50 
The League still held out the possibility for “the use of international 
cooperation for the common welfare of the common peoples of a world in 
want.”51 Liberal internationalist means, however, could all too easily be 
diverted towards great power, imperialist ends. 
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Like so many internationalists who detested the Versailles treaty, 
Berle did not see a world in peace in the early 1920s but instead perceived 
readiness for renewed fighting in multiple hotspots around the world. 
Their perceptions remind present-day readers that the interwar period 
should not be understood as peacetime but as an era of slow-simmering 
conflict before the renewed outbreak of unrestrained warfare in China and 
on the European continent in the 1930s. In addition to the unsettled borders 
and firefights that continued to plague postwar Europe for years after the 
official end of the Great War, the major international powers continued to 
arm themselves.52 As disarmament talks began in Washington, D.C. in 
November 1921, Berle observed that ongoing preparation for conflict 
“makes peace merely a milder form of war activity.”53 He then described 
a dark set of realities: “Munitions are piled up; weapons perfected; guns 
tested; spies broadcast in suspect countries; industrial plants made readily 
adaptable to military use; propaganda machinery completed.”54 In a setting 
of deep-seated insecurity, distrust, ambition, and short-sighted leadership 
among the strongest nations, the production of war materiel drained 
valuable resources, perpetuated want among the vulnerable masses, and 
guaranteed the resumption of armed conflict. Berle predicted dire 
consequences should the Washington Conference fall short of its goals: 
“Failure . . . this time will mean immediate, definite misery; probably a 
Far Eastern war with ourselves as principles [sic].”55 
Although from a present-day vantage point Berle’s prediction might 
seem uncannily prescient, it was actually par for the course in the interwar 
period, when every international confrontation raised fears of ruinous 
escalation to a new world war. The New Republic, for example, regularly 
highlighted the potential for renewed hostilities to break out, whether in 
response to Japan’s determination to increase its power in China, the 
dangers of Polish nationalism, and the tensions between France and 
Germany in the early 1920s, or the Japanese takeover of Manchuria, 
brewing conflict in the Balkans, and the rise of Nazism in the early 1930s. 
Today, Americans tend erroneously to think of the 1920s and 1930s as a 
peaceful interim between the two world wars, particularly amid the heady 
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economic growth and cultural exuberance of the “Roaring Twenties.” 
When contemporary observers contemplated international conditions, 
however, they found at best an unstable and dangerous hiatus from all-out 
warfare, in which any crisis of the moment might constitute the spark that 
would set off the next great global conflagration. When Berle surveyed the 
state of the world in the early 1920s, he expressed common sentiments in 
understanding the post-World War I settlement as an abject failure that 
could not establish or maintain international stability. Hence the desperate 
need for a new, creative, and effective internationalism in a world that 
otherwise seemed destined to return to war. 
III. EUROPEAN CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC LIBERALISM,  
AND THE EXCEPTIONALISM OF THE AMERICAS: BERLE ON FOREIGN 
POLICY IN THE 1930S 
Although Berle issued a series of public commentaries about the 
United States and international affairs in the early 1920s, after his 
demobilization from the Army, he concentrated primarily on building his 
legal and academic career, along with his place in New York City’s high-
powered, progressive intellectual and political circles. Berle first 
combined a corporate law career with two years in residence at the Henry 
Street Settlement, a leading institution within the settlement house 
movement and its model of progressive reform. His experience with 
parsing out the legal technicalities of landholding in the Dominican 
Republic, where determination of title required reckoning with the 
legacies of Spanish colonial rule, then led, in 1923, to a stint of pro bono 
work in New Mexico on behalf of the American Indian Defense 
Association. Meanwhile, his corporate legal practice and fascination with 
the social implications of the corporate form led to articles in academic 
law journals and attempts to obtain an academic position. In 1927, amid 
the intellectual ferment of legal realism, Berle’s interests in the dynamic 
between law and society led to a grant from Harvard Business School for 
a collaborative study on the corporation with an economist, an 
appointment to the Columbia Law School, and a partnership with Gardiner 
Means, an old friend who happened also to be a graduate student in 
economics at Columbia. Their research, of course, produced the twentieth 
century’s signature work on law, economics, and the radically changed 
nature of property ownership in modern society, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property.56 
With the Great Depression in full force, Berle’s novel understanding 
of the changed social, economic, and legal realities that, from a liberal 
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perspective, mandated an innovative governmental policy response, along 
with his New York connections, made him a natural pick for New York 
governor Franklin D. Roosevelt’s inner circle of experts—the so-called 
“brain trust”—when Roosevelt decided to run for president in 1932. Berle 
drafted speeches and dispensed advice on economic policy during the 
campaign, but he did not take an official position in the new 
Administration. Berle liked to be close to power, but he resisted the 
constraints of formal appointments. He preferred to work behind the 
scenes and to stay in New York City. For the next several years, he 
weighed in periodically on economic policy, especially financial matters, 
proselytized publicly on behalf of the New Deal and state capitalism, and 
muscled in on city government by allying himself with Fiorello La 
Guardia’s mayoralty.57 
Given Berle’s avoidance of an administrative position with the New 
Deal, it was surprising when he agreed, at the behest of both Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, to become 
Assistant Secretary of State in 1938. Indeed, when Hull first broached the 
subject in the spring of 1937, Berle wrote in his diary that he “would give 
a good deal to get out of it.”58 But with Roosevelt’s apparent assent to the 
idea that the appointment would give the State Department its own 
braintruster in the White House, Berle took the assignment.59 He planned 
on staying for just six months, but after the German invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, Roosevelt withdrew his acceptance of Berle’s 
resignation, and Berle ended up serving for the next six years.60 
In his capacity as a State Department official, Berle acted as a kind 
of jack-of-all-trades who advised the Administration on all matters as he 
saw fit, whether on domestic economic policy or U.S. foreign relations. 
On a practical, day-to-day level, he dealt with problems of war 
mobilization, the diplomatic balancing acts mandated by U.S. neutrality 
prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, questions of debt service in Latin America 
and the maintenance of exchange balances with European powers that 
employed his legal and financial expertise, and other U.S. foreign policy 
matters.61 With the renewal of great power conflict looming in Europe and 
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Asia, he also used his position as a public platform for articulating 
cooperative political alternatives to the destructive expansionism that 
threatened yet again to plunge the world into violence. In accordance with 
basic progressive principles, Berle continued to hope that human beings 
could learn to control their collective destiny through the application of 
reason over crude forms of self-interest and create a future in which “at 
last an intelligent method by which international affairs may be handled in 
the common interest of peoples.”62 For Berle, the “cooperative peace” of 
the Americas and liberal economics offered the best possibilities for 
finding some way out of the traditional rivalries that had repeatedly 
undermined stability in Europe throughout the continent’s history, as well 
as the imperialist machinations across the Pacific that made Asia an 
equally likely flashpoint for setting off the next great war.63 
As an answer to what Berle called the “‘death watch’ of Europe” and 
the other grim circumstances of the late 1930s, Berle heralded the 
Americas as an instructive example of enlightened and cooperative 
statesmanship. Berle had advised on the Roosevelt Administration’s Good 
Neighbor policy, which promised to replace the era of American military 
interventionism in the Caribbean in the first third of the twentieth century 
with a more egalitarian and cooperative foreign policy stance towards 
Latin America. He also took part in the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference, 
which sought a coordinated hemispheric response to the rise of fascism in 
Europe. Although the conference did not arrive at a firm consensus, 
representatives from twenty-one nations signed a “Declaration of 
Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation” that reaffirmed 
pan-American respect for the sovereignty of the region’s nations and their 
relations with each other on a basis of equality, and they agreed to mutual 
consultations to deal with threats to peace in the Americas.64 These 
experiences, combined with his early Army assignment in the Dominican 
Republic and his general interest in events in the Caribbean and South 
                                                     
 62. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Address at the George Washington University Winter Conference on 
Inter-American Affairs (December 5, 1939), in Cooperative Peace in the Western Hemisphere, 1 
DEP’T ST. BULL. 659, 663 (1939). 
 63. A long historical tradition on both sides of the Atlantic drew strong contrasts between the 
Old World and the New, whether in terms of Old World civilization vs. the energy and barbarity of 
the Americas, or the corrupt power politics of international affairs in Europe vs. a more enlightened 
state of affairs in U.S. free trade ideology or in relations across the Americas more generally. See 
PELLS, supra note 18, at 2–5. Berle expressed a version of the latter narrative in 1941, when he outlined 
a long history of warfare on the European continent from the late sixteenth century onwards vs. the 
promise of an American-led peace someday in the future. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Coming Epoch of 
Rebuilding, 4 DEP’T ST. BULL. 611, 612–15 (1941). 
 64. SCHWARZ, supra note 42, at 122; see also Declaration of Principles of Inter-American 
Solidarity and Cooperation, Dec. 21, 1936 (available via the Avalon Project: http://avalon.law.yale. 
edu/20th_century/intam07.asp [https://perma.cc/W3U7-CFF8]). 
404 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:385 
America, formed the basis for Berle’s public insistence from the late 1930s 
onward that the exceptionalism of the Americas offered a model for an 
internationalism that could maintain peace and stimulate economic 
prosperity. 
Throughout his tenure at the State Department, Berle grafted his faith 
in the collaborative relationships of nations in the Americas with well-
established progressive internationalist themes, particularly modern 
interdependence and the virtues of gradualism. As he explained in an 
address on the Lima Conference, broadcast late in 1938, in a global order 
bound together by ever-more intricate economic ties, new 
communications technologies, and air travel, the peace and stability of the 
Americas manifested the benefits of internationalism. “We are no longer 
two vast islands,” Berle stated loftily, “but part of an integrated 
civilization.”65 Berle then went on to paint an idyllic picture of how 
international relations functioned in the western hemisphere. In a region 
of independent nations free from the yoke of empire, competition 
remained confined to the positive sphere of cultural interchange rather 
than the amassing of armaments, and barriers to trade remained low, to the 
mutual benefit of all. As Berle told his listeners, in sharp contrast to 
Europeans who suffered through the Great War, “You have not a bomb-
proof shelter in your back yard; you have never seen a gas mask. That is 
the great achievement of cooperative friendship in the western world.”66 
Together, the nations of the Americas had built “the peace of cooperation” 
rather than “the peace of empire.”67 
These achievements, Berle contended, resulted from the virtues of an 
internationalism that accepted incremental change over flashy gestures 
and grand promises. Hard times and the enormity of global problems led 
to desires for immediate solutions. Berle observed, “People are tempted to 
look for spectacular developments; to expect drama; to seek magnificent 
achievements.”68 But that was not how the world worked. “Real progress 
on the road to peace,” he argued, “is rarely made that way. Spectacular 
diplomacy, or, to quote a phrase, ‘sudden diplomacy,’ is unusual, and 
when it does happen is often a mistake.”69 The Americas had stabilized 
relations only through a slow and unglamorous process of negotiation and 
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change, in which “[o]ver a period of years we have overcome suspicions, 
settled outstanding controversies, [and] created mutual trust.”70 
In subsequent years, as war engulfed East Asia and Europe, Berle 
echoed this theme of successful international cooperation in the Americas 
in order to outline the possibility of a peaceful alternative to mutually 
destructive violence between nations. As he crowed in March 1941, in a 
special issue of Survey Graphic on the Americas, the region had achieved 
a “cooperative peace” with effective working arrangements that granted it 
a productive “peace without empire.”71 Two months later, in another essay 
in Survey Graphic, Berle again touted the exceptionalism of the Americas, 
where “we have not needed to invoke dictatorship nor create strange 
doctrines of master peoples, nor to force agreements by threats of 
conquest, nor to coerce unwilling neighbors into the cooperation of 
servitude.”72 Instead, the western hemisphere had made itself “the very 
embodiment of cooperative action” and created “the most apt instrument 
of civilization which the world has yet seen.”73 
Of course, such blustery professions of hemispheric comity should 
not be taken at face value, given Latin America’s place in U.S. foreign 
relations as what Greg Grandin has called “a workshop of empire.”74 
Grandin has stressed a long record of U.S. interventionism up to the early 
1930s: “by 1930, Washington had sent gunboats into Latin American ports 
over six thousand times,” and in the first third of the twentieth century, 
“U.S. troops invaded Caribbean countries at least thirty-four times, 
occupied Honduras, Mexico, Guatemala, and Costa Rica for short periods, 
and remained in Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican 
Republic for longer stays.”75 Anti-imperialist critics of the United States 
in the interwar period also described the nation’s policy towards its 
hemispheric neighbors in harsh terms. Protestant missionary and staunch 
anti-interventionist Samuel Guy Inman, for example, in a 1924 essay, 
underscored the long record of U.S. imperial control in the Caribbean 
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whether through military means, economic domination, or both. “In these 
smaller countries of the South, controlled by our soldiers, our bankers, and 
our oil kings,” Inman declared, “we are developing our Irelands, our 
Egypts, and our Indias.” In the process, he continued, “[w]e are piling up 
hatreds, suspicions, records for exploitation and destruction of sovereignty 
in Latin America, such as have never failed in all history to react in war, 
suffering, and defeat of high moral and spiritual ideals.”76 
Berle himself was not blind to this history of U.S. imperialism in the 
Americas, particularly the Caribbean. Indeed, in the early 1920s, he had 
strongly condemned the abuses of American occupation forces and U.S. 
corporate power in the region. As he wrote of the Dominican Republic in 
1921, U.S. intervention had failed to advance public health, infrastructure, 
or education, and military atrocities had accompanied the de facto reality 
of American conquest.77 Meanwhile, in Haiti, Berle observed, the United 
States had become the equivalent of the Germans in Belgium during the 
Great War.78 In the late 1930s and early 1940s, Berle also sometimes 
alluded publicly to the recent history of U.S. imperialism in the region, 
although for the most part he considered such episodes part of a benighted 
past that had been replaced by a new era of hemispheric cooperation.79 
Such concerns constituted more than mere lip service for Berle, who 
also voiced them in behind-the-scenes policymaking contexts throughout 
his diplomatic career. He paid close attention to the sensitivities of U.S. 
and European power in the Americas, especially when it came to Brazil, a 
country that he thought was on the verge of becoming a major player in 
global affairs.80 In March 1943, for example, amid Allied discussions of 
postwar economic planning, Berle insisted that the other American 
republics be kept in the loop whether or not they were formally part of the 
wartime alliance, except for Argentina with its pro-fascist leanings. In 
particular, he noted Brazil’s sense of exclusion from the post-World War I 
settlement and emphasized the need “to keep our American associates, and 
especially Brazil, fully advised of what was going on.”81 As U.S. 
Ambassador to Brazil in 1945 and 1946, Berle also sided in significant 
instances with Brazilian sovereignty and interests. In the spring of 1945, 
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he cautioned U.S. officials to cooperate with Brazil’s leadership rather 
than indulge any temptation on the part of the United States and its chief 
wartime allies to seize German archival materials in Brazil. “Brazil has 
already promised access to information in question,” he emphasized, 
whereas “[j]oint demand here by four principal Allies for possession of 
these archives would provoke immediate explosion. . . . It was Germany 
who surrendered, not Brazil.”82 Towards the end of the year, he vigorously 
attacked U.S. efforts to make inroads on Brazilian control over Brazilian 
oil. According to the notes of the conversation that took place among State 
Department officials, although Berle agreed to follow instructions, he also 
“made it clear that he, as an individual, wished to have no part of” the 
effort to force oil concessions on Brazil. Rather, Berle insisted, “the 
Brazilians had a right to go into the refining business in their own country 
and that any effort on our part to oppose such a development would be 
construed by the Brazilians as an unwarranted interference with an internal 
matter.”83 Thus, to at least a noteworthy extent, Berle attempted to put his 
long-held antipathy towards imperial rule into practice during his tenure 
at the Department of State. Moreover, even the most critical of scholars 
have recognized the distinctiveness of the Good Neighbor era and the 
seriousness of Roosevelt’s commitment to what Grandin has labeled “a 
decade of unparalleled hemispheric cooperation.”84 
At the same time, however, Berle papered over darker historical 
realities, as well as the imbalances of power that co-existed with 
professions of egalitarian good will towards the rest of the Americas. For 
example, in his public pronouncements as Assistant Secretary of State, 
Berle concentrated on recent decades and managed to avoid ever 
mentioning the United States’ aggressive conquest and seizure of half of 
Mexico’s territory in the U.S.–Mexico War of the 1840s.85 Like other 
boosters of pan-Americanism, he wanted to believe that U.S. policy had 
turned over a new leaf after World War I, first with Secretary of State 
Charles Evans Hughes’s conciliatory gestures towards international 
cooperation in the Americas after the one hundredth anniversary of the 
Monroe Doctrine in 1923, and then the adoption of the Good Neighbor 
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policy a decade later.86 By side-stepping a deep-seated past and focusing 
on the more pleasing aspects of hemispheric relations in the Rooseveltian 
era, Berle constructed a parable of the Americas as a cooperative 
alternative to corrupt, militaristic relations, particularly on the European 
continent. This harmonious image of comity across the Americas, 
however, conveniently ducked harder questions about economic 
liberalism and its implications for U.S. relations in the region that would 
ultimately return full force during the Cold War. 
Berle’s publicly articulated faith in an exceptionalism of the 
Americas hinted at the widespread benefits of a liberal international 
economic order, a commitment on Berle’s part that rested on free trade as 
the long-established, historically rooted cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy 
ideology. From the nation’s founding onward, U.S. leaders hailed free 
trade and market access as an enlightened alternative to European imperial 
corruption and a means by which a militarily weak but resource-rich 
United States could make its way in the world.87 Twentieth-century 
notions of modern interdependence further strengthened the progressive 
internationalism that eventually evolved into mid-twentieth century liberal 
orthodoxy. As Berle stated in a radio address in February 1935, several 
years before he joined the Department of State, “The breaking of 
international barriers is the major problem in foreign relations. We have a 
world economy; it is trying to operate in separate compartments 
throughout the western world.”88 From Berle’s standpoint, it simply did 
not make sense for states to operate contrary to modern economic realities. 
Doing so only fomented international instability. As Berle put it in a public 
lecture in March 1939, “A world which does not permit commerce to flow 
freely is a world in constant distress.” By contrast, “If trade is open, 
fighting is unnecessary.”89 Liberal order redounded to the mutual benefit 
of all. 
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Berle elaborated upon his reasoning in an address that reflected upon 
the deteriorating political situation in Europe in mid-1937. With war 
looming across the Atlantic, Berle called upon American business leaders 
to embrace a liberal international economic order. He explained the 
impossibility of self-sufficiency for the major powers, all of which 
required resources from outside their borders, including in some cases, the 
basic means of feeding their populations. They could acquire these goods 
only through two options: trade or force. As Berle put it, “If commerce 
fails, there is only one resource left—that of conquest.”90 American 
business, however, had too often dealt with the deteriorating economic 
environment of the Great Depression by devoting its energies to the self-
defeating mission of “figuring out ways of excluding all foreign goods,” 
which not only had damaging economic effects but destabilized political 
relationships as well.91 “A general exclusion of other countries from their 
obvious markets,” he warned, “must contribute directly to a disordered, 
warlike, and ultimately revolutionary world.”92 Peace and stability 
required liberal economics, a point that Berle would continue to reinforce 
in subsequent years. 
When it came to the specifics of liberal order, Berle translated his 
expertise in corporate finance into a call for government-mediated 
provision of credit at an international level. Here he appealed to the 
Americas as a source of useful lessons. As he observed in a 1939 essay, 
loans to South American trading partners in the 1920s had generally 
resulted in lost investments, which led potential investors to shy away 
from new commitments despite the ongoing need for long-term credit as a 
basis of economic development. Government agencies, such as the 
Export-Import Bank, offered the possibility of making up the shortfall and 
assuming necessary risks that private investors no longer wished to incur.93 
Eventually, Berle hoped, the creation of an inter-American bank as a new 
international institution could facilitate healthy forms of investment and 
development across national boundaries.94 The disaster of international 
finance post-World War I, Berle stressed in the fall of 1942 to an audience 
of Alabama businessmen, made imperative a workable system of 
“economic power achieved by cooperation” someday in the future, when 
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the new world war would end, and the United States could “embark on the 
task of healing the world.”95   
Berle’s conception of modern international finance dovetailed neatly 
with themes he had developed in the early 1930s in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, particularly the disjuncture between 
traditional notions of political economy and the nature of economic life in 
the modern corporate era.96 Just as the modern corporation had utterly 
demolished old concepts of property ownership through the separation of 
ownership and control, by the early 1940s, Berle could also argue that the 
old economics of colonial extraction and nineteenth-century economic 
imperialism no longer made sense in a world in which ownership mattered 
less than “that the product shall be available on reasonable terms.”97 
Similarly, the twentieth-century revolution in finance, to Berle’s mind, had 
overcome the Marxian thesis “that nations would fight whenever it became 
difficult to export capital.”98 Instead, he argued, “Today, when an inter-
American development scheme is proposed, ‘capital’ is really the last 
thing we think about.”99 Where The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property had outlined a historical shift in the nature of ownership that 
created a public stake in corporate economic life and a rightful place for 
government intervention, a revolution in finance similarly sparked a 
movement towards the government-mediated export of capital, aimed not 
at profit but at desired developmental results. Berle observed, “To 
continue the pace [of modern industrial production], there had to be a 
general rise in standards of living everywhere. The economic interest in 
‘markets’ became, not a private concern, but a matter of social and 
governmental policy.”100 
Thus Berle arrived at the liberal economic internationalist creed: the 
global economy was not a zero-sum game that required some nations to 
be mired in poverty in order to serve others’ prosperity, but rather, 
economic growth and development, wherever they occurred, contributed 
to global political stability as well as the health of international economic 
life.101 As Berle confidently told an audience of teachers in March 1944, 
“The day of the exploiter is gone, and exploitation can be no part of 
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American policy. . . . [T]he generation coming of age must be taught that 
foreign business and foreign trade is the art of contributing to the foreign 
country rather than the art of seizing an exploiter’s profit.”102 
Beneath this idealized version of a liberal international economic 
order, however, lay the harsher conditions of geopolitical power. On the 
one hand, Berle understood such realities, and he argued that heavy-
handed action by the United States would endanger the free-flowing 
capitalism that the world needed post-World War II. In December 1945, 
for example, he warned the Department of State yet again that the effort 
to gain U.S. oil concessions in Brazil was “both highly dangerous and 
highly unsound.”103 If the United States pushed too hard, he insisted, “the 
immediate result of representation when made will be [an] instant 
declaration by [the] Brazilian Gov[ernmen]t that they consider refining 
[an] industry affected with a public interest under [the] Economic Charter 
[of the Americas], closing the door to free capital movement in this 
industry for some time to come, and killing the very promising attempt 
which [the] Petroleum Council is now making towards liberalization.”104 
On the other hand, however, the broader contours of U.S. economic 
relationships inevitably put the Department of State in the service of 
American financial interests. Although the United States generally 
refrained from gunboat diplomacy during the “Good Neighbor” years, the 
Foreign Bondholders’ Protective Council relied upon State Department 
officials, including Berle, for diplomatic intervention whenever 
opportunities loomed to resume payments on defaulted bonds or otherwise 
uphold American bondholders’ interests, whether in Panama, Brazil, Haiti, 
El Salvador, or elsewhere in the region.105 The foreign policy 
establishment and U.S. oil companies also coordinated over efforts to gain 
compensation for nationalized oil industries in Mexico and Bolivia in the 
late 1930s.106 In addition, loans for monetary stabilization, development 
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aid, or other purposes reinforced U.S. power throughout the Americas.107 
Where proponents of economic liberalism argued for a mutually beneficial 
web of relationships at work, critics have always suspected imperialism 
by another name. The Good Neighbor policy eased historical tensions for 
a time and raised hopes for a new beginning, but it never transcended 
American economic priorities. 
Moreover, concessions to Latin American interests also reflected the 
pragmatic requirements of U.S. policy in the 1930s and 1940s, particularly 
as Berle and other State Department officials sought to shore up 
hemispheric defenses after World War II broke out in Europe.108 
Furthermore, in other parts of the world, Berle conceded American 
interests in defending European allies’ colonial prerogatives, despite his 
own instinctive anti-imperialism. Following the invasion of the 
Netherlands in May 1940, for example, he told the Australian Foreign 
Minister “that we felt that the status quo in the Dutch West Indies, as well 
as the Dutch East Indies, ought to be preserved.”109 In September 1940, 
when French diplomats feared U.S. policy towards Japan would sell out 
French colonial interests in Indochina, then under Japanese occupation, 
Berle similarly reassured the French Ambassador “that this Government 
had specifically asserted its desire to protect the French Empire as a part 
of the heritage of the French people.”110 Chinese territorial claims also did 
not escape Berle’s notice, and in the spring of 1943, he reminded the 
Office of Strategic Services not to offend Chinese sensibilities as it carried 
out operations in Tibet.111 Berle’s anti-colonial leanings notwithstanding, 
he did not hesitate to ally U.S. foreign policy with other imperial powers’ 
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desire to preserve their territorial claims, especially when necessary to 
shore up allied nations’ positions on the European continent. 
At the same time, wartime relations between the United States and 
its European partners did not always proceed smoothly, and U.S. interests 
did not necessarily move in lockstep with European imperial preferences. 
Berle’s well-known distrust of British intentions, for example, expressed 
itself in multiple ways.112 In one incident in late 1940, Berle carped about 
British reticence over how best to manage and balance exchange in French 
Morocco, which meant that “it might be necessary for us to consider taking 
an independent line if British policy remained obscure, and we desired to 
cooperate.”113 Two years later, following the assassination of François 
Darlan in Algiers for his service in the Vichy government, Cordell Hull 
similarly griped about British efforts to take diplomatic advantage of the 
situation at the expense of the United States, when the United States had 
bent over backwards not to attack British colonialism in India.114 In the 
summer of 1943, Berle also warned Hull “to be very cautious about 
committing ourselves to the line which the British apparently wish to 
follow” when it came to the return of Greece’s monarchy to power after 
the war.115 
As concerns with the shape of the postwar peace began to replace the 
immediate needs of the war, U.S. policy also walked a fine line on whether 
or not to align itself with French imperial designs. During the debate in the 
fall of 1943 over whether the Allies should employ Chinese troops against 
the Japanese occupation of Indochina, Berle emphasized that the issue 
spoke to the fundamental motivations of the United States: “whether, in 
the Far East, we are reestablishing the western colonial empires or whether 
we are letting the East liberate itself if it can do so.”116 He followed up the 
next day with a prescient comment to Undersecretary of State Edward R. 
Stettinius, Jr.: “Frankly, I doubt if we could defend before the Congress a 
very considerable expenditure of American lives for the sole purpose of 
keeping Indo-China in French, as against Chinese or Indo-Chinese, 
hands.”117   
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Ultimately, Berle’s diplomatic career exemplified the contradictions 
between internationalist aspirations and the workings of U.S. power 
throughout the twentieth century, whether in the Americas or in the world 
as a whole. In his public writings and addresses, Berle portrayed the 
extension of the Good Neighbor policy and an expanding liberal economic 
order as paths toward constructive alternatives to the instability and 
violence of power politics. During his service in the Department of State, 
however, a long tradition that identified U.S. foreign policy interests with 
the interests of American investors and corporations, the pressures of 
wartime alliances, and the United States’ own uneasy identity as an 
expansionist, imperial power that nonetheless identified ideologically with 
its own anti-colonial history formed the combined realities that made any 
easy transition to Berle’s ideal world impossible. Indeed, the ascendance 
of the United States to superpower status ultimately meant a Cold War 
order that relied more on a preponderance of American economic and 
military power than on the cooperative relationships and liberation from 
geopolitics that liberal internationalists had so ardently sought during the 
interwar years. 
CONCLUSION: BERLE, LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM,  
AND GLOBAL DISORDER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
In the post-World War II period, as the United States adapted to its 
newfound capacity to dominate global affairs, Berle himself also moved 
from his progressive roots to the establishmentarian inclinations of an 
elder statesman in Cold War American politics. Thomas McCormick, in 
an essay written in the early 1990s, adeptly described the contrast between 
Berle’s early theoretical daring and his later middle-of-the-road 
pragmatism as “a classic servant of power.”118 Over time, McCormick 
contended, Berle moved from a bold “moral and intellectual model of 
social capitalism” (that is, an early twentieth-century progressive critique 
of capitalism) to a more pallid mid-century liberal orthodoxy.119 
Ultimately, “Berle the intellectual, imaginatively confronting the pivotal 
issues of equity and efficiency, had metamorphosed into Berle the booster, 
energetically promoting economic internationalism as a way to evade and 
beg those issues.”120 During his tenure in the State Department in the late 
1930s and early 1940s, Berle’s circumscribed acknowledgments of the 
not-so-distant history of American imperialism set his path towards his 
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liberal anti-communism and uncritical embrace of Rostovian 
modernization theory during the Cold War. Rather than acknowledge the 
aspirations for national independence that drove anti-colonial and post-
colonial politics in multiple parts of the world, he blamed anti-American 
sentiments on communism and turned a blind eye to the U.S. military 
interventionism and covert operations that became a signature feature of 
American power in the Cold War.121 
The experience of the Cold War exposed the ease with which 
American liberal ideology could be used to scuttle other nations’ efforts to 
chart out independent futures for themselves. The peoples of Iran, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and East Timor, among 
other places, paid a heavy price for the United States’ Cold War 
interventionism. At the same time, however, the harsh, deteriorating 
climate of the interwar years also provides a stark reminder of the dangers 
of illiberalism and the conditions that motivated liberal internationalists in 
the 1920s and 1930s. In his history of the “Short Twentieth Century” from 
1914 to 1991, Eric Hobsbawm evocatively described the catastrophic state 
of global affairs from the final years of World War I to the early years of 
World War II. Hobsbawm underscored the truly dire conditions of the era: 
“while the economy tottered, the institutions of liberal democracy virtually 
disappeared between 1917 and 1942 from all but a fringe of Europe and 
parts of North America and Australasia, as fascism and its satellite 
authoritarian movements and regimes advanced.”122 
From the perspective of those who held on to faith in the early 
twentieth century progressive, humanitarian project of peace and the 
creation of a world that would allow individuals to realize their fullest 
human capacities, including meaningful participation in the political lives 
of their communities, the world fell apart in the interwar years, and it 
required liberal institutions for its post-World War II reconstruction. For a 
generation that lived through the disaster of two world wars, liberal order 
brought peace and stability in Europe, even as the Cold War conflict and 
the simultaneous post-colonial struggles of the decades that followed 
World War II extracted heavy costs from the Third World. 
Meanwhile, present-day developments underscore the risks of 
abandoning liberal institutions and policies. Although the state of liberal 
order in the twenty-first century has not yet reached a level of chaos 
comparable to that of the 1930s, it has become more tenuous than it has 
been in many a decade. The current age of Brexit and Trumpism, growing 
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doubts about the benefits of open markets and calls for heightened trade 
barriers, suspicions of immigrants and demands for tighter borders across 
Europe and the United States, and the ugly reassertion of blood-and-soil 
nationalisms and their attendant racism amid the ongoing reconfiguration 
of power in the international system all reflect an erosion of confidence in 
liberal democratic institutions to an extent not seen since before World 
War II. It is simplistic to think that the past repeats itself or to draw 
analogies that fail to recognize the unique features of a given historical 
moment. But history does provide resources for contemplating realms of 
possibility beyond our own and for identifying the warning signs of 
dangerous instability, particularly in an ever-changing global order where 
the United States can no longer assume the preponderance of power that it 
possessed in the decades that immediately followed the end of World 
War II. 
It seems fitting that this essay appears right around the hundredth 
anniversary of the start of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. After the 
passage of a century since the end of World War I, however, few people 
now alive can recall in a deep-seated, visceral way, as Hobsbawm did in 
The Age of Extremes, just how unstable and dangerous the world seemed 
in the interwar period, and just how ruinous the collective effects were of 
individual nations’ decisions to turn inward. A time period when people 
still believed that the future would be fundamentally different from, and 
better than, the present, however, also continually generated a creative 
search for novel options and possibilities. Berle certainly did not offer an 
indisputable diagnosis or unimpeachable set of solutions to the world’s 
problems in the 1920s and 1930s. The diverse intellectual resources of the 
time period and their access to political power, however, perhaps 
highlights best what seems most lacking—and most needed—in American 
politics today. 
